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A Bumpy Interregional Relationship 
1. Introduction 
Although diehard realists still view the nation state as the main actor in an 
anarchical international environment, its dominant role has come under 
siege. Analysts inspired by neoliberal and institutionalist thinking hold 
against realists that globalization has shaped an international system in 
which interdependence and cooperation have fostered the rise of new influ-
ential actors such as inter- and transnational organizations. It is thus no ac-
cident that there is a rapidly growing literature which treats international 
institutions both as a dependent as well as an independendent variable of 
state behavior. Regional organizations, proliferating in the past two dec-
ades, have been a particular focus of this research. While there exists now 
considerable knowledge on the genesis, evolution, efficiency and legiti-
macy of such regional organizations and,  vice versa, their i mpact on the 
behavior of nation states, scholars have neglected the fact that regional or-
ganizations are developing their own external relations and becoming a c-
tors in their own right (Cremona 1998; Ginsberg 1999). While the Euro-
pean Union (EU) is spearheading these developments, other regional o r-
ganizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Mercosur, the Andean Community, the South Asian Association for R e-
gional Cooperation (SAARC), the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to name only a 
few, are busily developing their own interregional networks. Jürgen Rüland 
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Dating back to the early 1970s, ASEAN-EU relations have been spearhead-
ing this novel trend. As the perhaps most advanced interregional relation-
ship, thirty years of ASEAN-EU cooperation provide a rich empirical base 
for evaluating the achievements of these ties. For this purpose an analytical 
framework highlighting five major functions of interregionalism will be 
developed in the next section. Viewed from different theoretical angles, it 
attaches to interregionalism balancing, institution-building, r ationalizing, 
agenda-setting and identity-building functions. 
While the extent to which these functions can be identified in the ASEAN-
EU relationship provides us with more systematic insights i nto the latter’s 
substance, our analytical framework transcends ASEAN-EU relations. It 
permits us to offer some still tentative answers to the theoretically more 
challenging issue in what way interregional fora contribute to an emergent 
structure of global governance. Are they forming nodal points of interna-
tional relations, thereby facilitating a division of labor among international 
institutions? Or are they part of what Reinecke calls a „loose set of cross-
national policy patchworks, conspicuous for their missing links and unnec-
essary overlaps“ (Reinecke 1998:10)? Although a case study like the one 
presented here is hardly able to provide exhaustive answers to such far-
reaching questions, they will nevertheless be reconsidered in the conclud-
ing section of this paper. The preceding two sections, discussing the e m-
pirical material, subdivide ASEAN-EU relations into two major periods: 
the first covering the period until the end of the Cold War (1972-1990), the 
second focussing on the postbipolar era (1990-2001). 
2.  Interregionalism: A New Level of Interaction in 
International Relations 
The literature on regionalism distinguishes two waves of regionalization. A 
first wave in the 1950s and 1960s was basically inspired by the early suc-
cesses of European integration and the growing popularity of  dependencia 
theories with their emphasis on collective self-reliance in much of the Third 
World. They gave rise to the formation of regional organizations particu-
larly in Latin America and to a lesser extent in Asia, Africa  and the Arab ASEAN and the European Union 
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world. A second wave of regionalism, known as the New Regionalism, can 
be observed from the mid-1980s onward and is usually closely linked to the 
unfolding forces of economic liberalization and globalization. Nation 
states, especially weaker a nd smaller ones, are thereby perceived as r e-
sponding to the challenges of globalization by pooling resources and bar-
gaining power. 
The  New Regionalism has spurred a vertical differentiation of international 
relations which increasingly develop into a multi-tiered system ranging 
from the global multilateral level to the conventional bilateral ties between 
nation states (Rüland 1996a, 1999a, 2000). The proliferation of regional 
actors created a need for intermediaries linking global and regional institu-
tions and – at the lower end of the international system  – regional and n a-
tional policy-making levels. As a result interregional fora and subregional 
transborder institutions
1 emerged. While for the purpose of our study we 
may neglect the subregional level, it i s important to note here that the upper 
end of the international system bifurcated into two types of interregional-
ism: First, an older b ilateral interregionalism or bi-regionalism which can 
be traced back to the 1970s and, second, nascent forms of transregionalism 
emerging in the 1990s (Aggarwal/Morrison 1998; Rüland 1999b).
2 
ASEAN-EU relations have been thriving under both forms of interregional-
ism. 
Bilateral interregionalism such as the ASEAN-EU relationship can be d e-
fined as group-to-group dialogues with more or less regular meetings cen-
tering around exchanges of information and cooperation (projects) in spe-
cific policy fields (trade and investment, environment, crime prevention, 
narcotics trafficking etc.). It is based on a low level of institutionalization, 
usually at the ministerial, ambassadorial and senior officials‘ levels, some-
times supplemented by permanent or  ad hoc experts‘ working groups. 
 
1   Such as the Euroregions, the Southeast Asian growth triangles and quadrangles or 
the transborder regions between the United States and Canada and Mexico.  
2   For the distinction see Rüland, Jürgen (1999b): Transregional Relations: The Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) – A Functional Analysis, Paper prepared for the Interna-
tional Conference on „Asia and Europe on the Eve of the 21st Century“, 19-20 Au-
gust 1999 in Bangkok at Chulalongkorn University. Jürgen Rüland 
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There are no common overarching institutions, both sides exclusively rely 
on their own institutional infrastructure. 
Transregional institutions such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) or the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have a more diffuse member-
ship which does not necessarily coincide with regional organizations and 
may include member states from more than two regions. New members of 
regional organizations represented in a transregional forum will not be 
automatically allowed to enter the respective forum. As the agenda grows 
in complexity, transregional fora may, unlike bilateral interregional rela-
tions, develop their own organizational infrastructure such as a secretariat 
for research, policy planning, preparation and coordination of meetings and 
implementation of decisions. Such processes of institutional evolution vest 
transregional fora with some  form of independent actorness and distinguish 
them from bilateral interregionalism. 
Theories of international relations attach varying priority to international 
cooperation in general and regional cooperation in particular. Realists, for 
instance, do not v alue cooperation as a constituting norm of international 
relations. For them international organizations are merely another arena 
where nation states contest for power. States thus cooperate only as long as 
this enhances their power. Under such circumstances cooperation is over-
shadowed by persistent fears that the gains are distributed unequally and 
thus may lead to relative losses of power. Viewed from such a perspective 
cooperation can hardly be more than a short-term phenomenon.  
Even if globalization has reduced the efficiency of military capacities and 
power is now primarily determined economically, realists tend to view i n-
terregional relations chiefly in categories of power. Exemplary for this 
thinking is the representation even of economic competition in militaristic 
terminology such as „economic wars“ and „economic encircling“. In this 
context, inter- and transregional fora are viewed as a device of the Triad 
players for maintaining an equilibrium among themselves and of peripheral 
regions for adjusting to the dynamics of the Triad. Accordingly, i nter- and 
transregional fora may be regarded as a coalition or alliance of regional 
players directed against others which are activated when need arises. ASEAN and the European Union 
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Unlike realists liberal institutionalists regard cooperation as a key to miti-
gate the anarchical character of international relations, to minimize the i n-
cidence of violent conflict and to enhance the welfare of peoples. Coopera-
tion intensifies the flow of information between actors, builds trust and e n-
hances t he predictability of state behavior. By creating norms and rules de-
signed to guide state actions, cooperation has a legalizing effect on interna-
tional relations. Institution-building is thus considered an important prereq-
uisite for peaceful dispute settlement. 
Viewed from this angle, inter- and transregional fora add another institu-
tional layer to the international system and thus enhance the latter’s institu-
tional density. Facilitating this is the growth of subsidiary institutions such 
as summits, ministerial rounds, senior officials’ meetings, track two proc-
esses, expert working groups and NGO fora. Furthermore, inter- and trans-
regional fora create an increasing demand for internal coordination as 
members of regional organizations are well advised to formulate common 
positions prior to summits and ministerial meetings. It is not farfetched to 
assume that spillovers of better coordination are qualitative i ncreases of 
intraregional cooperation. Finally, if inter- and transregional dialogues also 
engage great  powers, they may contain their hegemonial ambitions and so-
cialize them into cooperative multilateralism. 
Similarly important, inter- and transregional fora may be perceived as  ra-
tionalizers of multilateral global fora. This refers to the fact that the latter 
have to contend with an increasingly complex and technical nature of pol-
icy matters and a growing number of actors, often representing extremely 
diverse interests. Consequently, multilateral negotiations at the global level 
nowadays proceed with a snail’s pace. Trade liberalization provides a good 
example. While early GATT rounds wound up within less than a year, the 
Kennedy Round (1964-1967) lasted three years, the Tokyo Round (1973-
1979) six years and the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) nearly eight years.
3  
Such agonizingly slow decision-making and the concomitant bazaar-style 
bargaining not only weaken the efficiency of global fora but, as a corollary, 
 
3   The documents WTO agreement cover 22,000 pages, not including fifteen subsidi-
ary agreements (Kevavapany 1996:23). Jürgen Rüland 
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also their legitimacy. Viewed against this background, r egional, inter- and 
transregional fora may divide  negotiations on global issues into a staggered 
bottom-up process which may start at the regional level before being ele-
vated to the inter- or transregional level and finally to the global level. On 
the aggregate such a step-by-step process may save time, a s consensus-
building in several numerically smaller fora is likely to be more efficient 
than in one unwieldy global body. Inter- and transregional dialogues thus 
streamline the overburdened agenda of global o rganizations, keep in check 
the ensuing bottlenecks at the top level of the international system and thus 
prevent a suffocation of global institutions. 
Inter- and transregional fora may also exert  agenda-setting ( or agenda-
controlling)  functions. They provide convenient platforms for building 
broad-based coalitions that may strongly lobby in favor of (or against) a 
certain issue in global institutions. Especially large players, which acting 
alone would encounter a lot of opposition in global institutions, and there-
fore would most likely resort to unilateral action, may use inter- and trans-
regional fora in such a way. But also middle powers may skilfully instru-
mentalize inter- and transregional dialogues for advancing policies that 
otherwise would encounter little support in global institutions. 
Finally, c onstructivists view international cooperation from a cognitive per-
spective. Cooperation is thus the result of previous experiences and interac-
tions. The way other regional organizations cooperate may thus have reper-
cussions on the own type of regionalism.  Constructivists therefore argue 
that inter- and transregional dialogues are spurring collective identities. E s-
pecially in heterogeneous and newly formed regional groupings interre-
gionalism may stimulate regional  identity-building. It may sharpen differ-
ences between self and other and thus help galvanize r egional solidarity on 
the basis of shared norms.  
Fostering „regionalism through interregionalism“ (Gilson 1998; Hänggi 
1999) may be intended or unintended. It is intentional, if one group offers 
material i ncentives to the other for strengthening regional cohesion. In the 
case of the EU, which is deliberately pursuing the role of an „external fed-
erator“, such a policy has a rationalizing effect on its own external relations ASEAN and the European Union 
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because it enables Brussels to negotiate policy frameworks with entire 
groups of countries where previously it had to deal with them individually. 
In cases of highly asymmetrical relationships inter- and transregionalism 
may however also generate unintended collective identity-building. This 
may be the case, if the relationship is perceived by one side as a device in 
the hands of the other to establish or consolidate superiority. Such percep-
tions, which tend to denounce the behavior of the superior organization in 
terms of paternalism or even neocolonialism, inevitably produce backlashes 
by encouraging the weaker organization to develop its own set of collective 
symbols and mythology in explicit opposition to the other side. The draw-
back, however, is that the ensuing relationship may be characterized by i n-
tensifying conflict and therefore may  – if not contained  – minimize the 
gains of cooperation and in the end even jeopardize the entire relationship. 
3.  ASEAN-EU Relations 1972-1990: Asymmetrical 
Indifference? 
The first initiative for developing ASEAN-EU relations came from 
ASEAN. It was basically a response to economic changes in Europe and 
shifts in the Asian power equation. With the British accession to the EC 
imminent in the early 1970s, former British colonies Malaysia and Singa-
pore were  concerned losing their comparatively liberal Commonwealth 
trade preferences (Snitwongse 1989; Gerlach 1993; Dreis-Lampen 1998; 
Bridges 1999; Yeung/Perdikis/Kerr 1999). The anticipated loss of a major 
European market and the trade barriers imposed by the European common 
market project became a strong rationale for a more systematic policy a p-
proach towards Brussels. This widely shared belief among ASEAN deci-
sion-makers was exacerbated by European tendencies to respond to the col-
lapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the two oil crises of the 
1970s with increased protectionism (Armbrosius 1996). However, over-
tures towards Europe were also motivated by a desire to balance the tradi-
tionally strong American economic presence in the region and a more r e-
cent aggressive Japanese trade offensive which revived memories of J a-
pan’s war-time  Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere  (Lukas Jürgen Rüland 
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1989:104). Strong anti-Japanese sentiments in the region surfaced with the 
„Buy Thai“ campaign launched by the Thai student movement (Mo-
rell/Samudavanija 1981; Girling 1981; Prizzia 1985) and the riots accom-
panying Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka’s state visit to Indonesia in 1974 
(Ricklefs 1993).  
Seen against this background, ASEAN interests centered on a better access 
to the European market and a price stabilization scheme (STABEX) for ag-
ricultural commodities (Dreis-Lampen 1998:121; Y eung/Perdikis/Kerr 
1999:80). Other objectives included attracting more European investment, 
promoting technology transfers and receiving more development aid. 
Achievements, however, were mixed. Positive, on a first glance, was the 
almost ten-fold increase of trade between 1971 and 1979 (Dreis-Lampen 
1998:119; Yeung/Perdikis/Kerr 1999:83) and the accelerated influx of 
European investments into Southeast Asia temporarily outgrowing even 
American and Japanese investments (Bridges 1999:79). Noteworthy is also 
the change in the composition of trade. By the end of the 1980s the per-
centage of manufactured products among traded goods had risen from 23.8 
percent to 60 percent (Dreis-Lampen 1998:119), thus gradually eliminating 
the old colonial trade structure with its exchange of primary goods for fin-
ished products. 
But neither the increase of the trade volume nor the increase of European 
investments significantly altered the economic position of the Triadic pow-
ers in the ASEAN region. Although new economic opportunities were 
opened for ASEAN through the European link, balancing effects r emained 
limited. Moreover, it is questionable to what extent intensified economic 
cooperation could be attributed to interregional relations. The EC General 
Systems of Preferences (GSP), to which ASEAN had access right from the 
beginning, was launched already by 1971, i.e. one year prior to the first di-
rect contacts between the two regional organizations. Interregional relations 
also did not decisively help ASEAN to rise in the EC’s preferential hierar-
chy which in the 1970s and 1980s was topped by former British and French 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) and Mediterranean 
countries. Through the  Lomé Treaties and special preferential agreements, 
both groups of countries received trade benefits more favorable than the ASEAN and the European Union 
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general preferences given by the EC to other developing countries. Never-
theless, at least to some extent, ASEAN was able to negotiate concessions 
from the EC which resulted in some „GSP plus“ treatment but failed to i n-
clude a STABEX scheme (Dreis-Lampen 1998:121). Moreover, ASEAN 
complaints over the EU’s alleged protectionist policies including the  fre-
quent use of antidumping legislation continued unabated throughout the 
entire period. Commodity agreements such as the one signed on tapioca 
imposed ceilings on Southeast Asian exports and thus did little to allay 
ASEAN complaints. The Multifibre Agreement (MFA) with its quota regu-
lations and Voluntary Export R estraints (VREs) further restricted ASEAN 
exports into the EU in other areas where the grouping enjoyed comparative 
advantages (Chee 1997:16). Finally, EC development aid was likewise a 
disappointment for ASEAN as on a per capita basis it remained well below 
the one granted to ACP countries. Yet, by all these limitations, capturing a 
staggering 42 percent of the EC’s trade with developing countries, ASEAN 
was the main beneficiary of the European GSP (Bridges 1999:77).  
Alhough Langhammer is probably right concluding that through collective 
bargaining ASEAN achieved more than through individual negotiations of 
its members (Langhammer 1987:143; Bridges 1999:79), all in all, at least 
in the economic sphere, it is hardly deniable that ASEAN-EC relations r e-
mained a highly asymmetrical donor-recipient relationship (Indorf 
1987:91). In 1989, ASEAN had a share of only 3.1 percent in the EC`s 
trade  – a mere 0.5 percent increase since 1980  -- , while, conversely, the 
EC’s share of ASEAN’s trade was lingering at around 15 percent (Ak-
rasanee 1982:25-26; Dreis-Lampen 1998:118). It is thus hardly a sign of 
European arrogance to conclude that the EC was much more important for 
ASEAN than ASEAN for the EC (Rieger 1991:38).  
The economic rationale for closer relations with Europe was paralleled by 
security concerns, qualifying claims in the literature which attribute the rise 
of interregionalism more or less exclusively to globalization. By the early 
1970s there was no doubt left that, as a result of their debacle in Vietnam, 
the United States would markedly reduce military presence in Asia. This, at 
least, was the unambiguous message of the  Nixon Doctrine announced as 
early as 1969. ASEAN members, with their pro-Western and anti-Jürgen Rüland 
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communist orientation, and, except for Indonesia and Malaysia, strongly 
relying on US military support, would henceforth be faced with the victori-
ous communist regimes in Indochina and a more assertive People’s Repub-
lic of China (Snitwongse 1989:229). To make things worse, American dis-
engagement coincided with a British withdrawal from positions east of 
Suez which  – despite maintaining a token presence in Southeast Asia 
through the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA)  -- was finished by 
1971. ASEAN responded to these changes by strengthening regional cohe-
sion, but also by broadening its diplomatic support base (Dreis-Lampen 
1998:88). Europe  – though hitherto basically an inward-looking player 
without much actor capacity in the field of foreign relations -- was seen as 
a pivotal partner in this respect. Still, for much of the pre-1990 era, political 
cooperation rarely went beyond the declaratory level. 
One of these occasions was the Soviet-supported occupation of Cambodia 
through Vietnamese troops in  December 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan one year later which gave a more concrete meaning to secu-
rity-related affinities between the two groupings (Teo 1985:119; Regels-
berger 1989:84; Rüland 1996a:18). Both partners shared concerns over 
what t hey perceived as a looming Soviet security threat which in the case 
of the EC was exacerbated by the deployment of SS-20 missiles targetting 
Western Europe and in the case of ASEAN by the modernization of the 
Soviet Pacific fleet to a formidable blue water navy and the acquisition of 
naval bases in Vietnam. The communiqués of the ministerial meetings per-
sistently highlighted these issues throughout the 1980s. Common interests 
to contain or at least balance growing Societ influence in Europe and 
Southeast Asia translated into coordinated diplomatic moves which – as we 
shall see later  – centered on the annual United Nations General A ssembly 
(Snitwongse 1989). 
If realists highlight the balancing aspects and gauge ASEAN-EC relations 
on this basis, institutionalists make the institution-building, agenda-setting 
and rationalizing functions the litmus test for ASEAN-EC relations. I ndeed, 
a dense network of institutions has evolved through ASEAN-EC coopera-
tion. The beginning was made through ASEAN’s Special Coordinating 
Committee (SCAN) which was set up in 1972 with the objective of con-ASEAN and the European Union 
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ducting an institutionalized dialogue with the EC. In the same year, the 
ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) was created (Snitwongse 1989:229). 
Composed of ASEAN diplomatic representatives a ccredited to the EC, it 
served as a liaison body in Brussels and as ASEAN’s ear at the pulse of 
European affairs. Later ambassadorial committees were established in 
Bonn, Paris and London, which meet on an annual basis with the host 
country’s foreign minister. The EC, apart from Delegations the first of 
which it opened in Bangkok in 1978, also established such committees in 
ASEAN capitals (Indorf 1987; Mols 1989). In 1975, relations became more 
formalized through the creation of a Joint Study Group comprising ASEAN 
and EC officials. Meanwhile, in Brussels ASEAN ambassadors had entered 
into a regular dialogue with the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) of the EC Council of Ministers. 
By the end of the 1970s a full-fledged interregional dialogue  – on the EC 
side tirelessly advocated by the former German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher  – had emerged (Chiang 1981: 330; Teo 1985:118). A 
first foreign ministers‘ meeting was held in 1978. Since then ministerial 
meetings became a regular event.  Hosted alternately by ASEAN and EC 
members, eleven ministerial meetings were held every eighteen months 
between 1978 and 1994, seven of them prior to 1990. In addition, since the 
early 1980s ASEAN and EC foreign ministers also met annually u nder the 
format of the ASEAN Postministerial Conferences (PMC)  – consultations 
ASEAN holds with its dialogue partners following its own a nnual Foreign 
Minister’s Meeting (AMM). In 1985 the first economic ministers‘ meeting 
convened which, however, came together only intermittently (Pretzell 
1996:163). Finally, in the late 1980s, in a move to systematically promote 
European investments in the region, the EC established Joint Investment 
Committees (JICs) in all ASEAN capitals (Dreis-Lampen 1998:126). 
Interregional cooperation also extended to the parliamentarian level. A dia-
logue between members of the European Parliament and the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentarian Organization (AIPO) takes place every eighteen months 
since 1975. Until 1996 ten meetings were held (Dreis-Lampen 1998:143). 
The European Parliament also has observer status at the annual AIPO gen-
eral assemblies. However, parliamentarian cooperation has been far from Jürgen Rüland 
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smooth as the European Parliament  – unlike EC governments and the 
Commission  – repeatedly harshly criticized ASEAN governments for h u-
man rights violations and democratic deficits (Dreis-Lampen 1998:144).  
The core of the ASEAN-EC relationship became a cooperation agreement, 
signed in Kuala Lumpur in March 1978. It was initially concluded for a 
five year term, after which it was to be renewed every two years, subject to 
the right of either party to terminate it by written notice given six month in 
advance of expiry. The agreement was extended to Brunei in 1985, after 
the latter had become a member of ASEAN. A Joint Cooperation Commit-
tee (JCC) meeting at least once a year was assigned to prepare, coordinate, 
implement and supervise the projects under the agreement (Dreis-Lampen 
1998:116). The cooperation agreement became a model for additional i n-
terregional relationships initiated by the EC such as with the Andean Group 
in 1983, Central American countries in 1984, the African front line states 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1986 (Regelsberger 1989:88; Lukas 
1989:103). 
Yet, most observers concur that the cooperation agreement failed to estab-
lish a special relationship between the two regional organizations (Leifer 
1998:203). The wording was vague, confined to expressions of intent and 
general principles such as mutual respect, nondiscrimination, facilitation 
and  diversification of trade, reduction of (non-tariff) trade barriers, techno-
logical and development cooperation. In so far as the intensified economic 
cooperation mentioned above is taken as an indicator for a successful de-
velopment of mutual ties, it has only marginally been influenced by the i n-
stitutionalization of EC-ASEAN relations. Increases in trade and invest-
ment must basically be attributed to ASEAN‘s dynamic export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) drive, a favorable business climate and the high 
economic growth rates enjoyed by ASEAN members throughout much of 
the 1970s and 1980s (Dreis-Lampen 1998; Bridges 1999; Y e-
ung/Perdikis/Kerr 1999; Robles 2001). 
Somewhat greater than on economic cooperation was the impact of institu-
tion-building on the political dialogue which grew out of the 1980 coopera-
tion agreement and – unlike in the case of ASEM – was established on the ASEAN and the European Union 
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explicit desire of ASEAN (Teo 1985:117). While in general agenda-setting 
and rationalization functions have played only a subordinate role in the ini-
tial period of ASEAN-EC relations
4, the political dialogue has at least 
somewhat stimulated these functions. The EC and ASEAN have, for i n-
stance, acted as agenda setters in the case of the Indochinese refugees, 
bringing the issue to the attention of global organizations such as the 
United National High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). Yet, sharp dis-
agreements over the treatment of refugees by ASEAN members and the 
slow pace of resettlement through European countries cannot be over-
looked. Agenda-setting also took place with regard to the Cambodia and 
Afghanistan conflicts which ASEAN and the EC helped to elevate to the 
UN General Assembly. EC-ASEAN cooperation was a major factor behind 
the annual resolutions of the General Assembly condemning the i nvasions 
(Hong 1998:214). However, in this case, too, the smooth wording of the 
joint communiqués following ASEAN-EC ministerial meetings glossed 
over divergent views. Some members of the EC, for instance, were far from 
happy over the inclusion of the genocidal Khmer Rouge in the Kampu-
chean Coalition Government supported by ASEAN. Also, with regard to 
Vietnam, not all EC members shared their partners‘ view of isolating that 
country and excluding it from European aid (Regelsberger 1989:84; Snit-
wongse 1989:231). As a result, critics contend, political c ooperation, too, 
stagnated (Regelsberger 1989:84) and was far from „realizing its poten-
tials“ (Yeung/Perdikis/Kerr 1999). Although the consultations usually cov-
ered a broad range of topics including the apartheid regime in South Africa 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict, they were little more than a very loose tour de 
horizon, mired in symbolism and without major consequences for the poli-
cies of both sides (Indorf 1987:98). 
While from the preceding paragraphs the conclusion may be drawn that the 
EC and ASEAN established many channels of communication, such a view 
tends to overlook the fact that the underlying institutions are rather shallow, 
loose and essentially based on „soft legalization“ (Abbott/Snidal 2000). 
 
4   For examples see Snitwongse (1989:232). Jürgen Rüland 
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There  are no binding obligations flowing out of them which are called for if 
the agenda-setter and the rationalizer functions are to be further developed.  
Several factors help explain this low level of institutionalization. First, the 
EC initially attached low  priority to its relations with ASEAN, and was 
therefore unwilling to invest much into the development of common insti-
tutions. The frequent absence of European foreign ministers from meetings 
is expression of this state of affairs which was perceived by ASEAN coun-
terparts as an affront (Snitwongse 1989:256; Pretzell 1996). Second, „deep 
institutionalization“ is at variance with ASEAN’s principles of cooperation. 
The much touted  ASEAN Way highlights „relationship-building“ instead of 
„institution-building“ (Ba 1997) and thus emphasizes principles such as 
consensus, personalism, flexibility, pragmatism, intergovernmentalism and, 
most essential, noninterference  into the internal affairs of partners (Dosch 
1993; Acharya 1997). Third, if balancing has been a major rationale for 
ASEAN-EC cooperation, the need for „deep institutionalization“ is indeed 
limited. As the constellation leading to an interregional coalition may 
change, costly investments into institutions will be avoided. However, such 
a low level of institutionalization also limits the likelihood and the oppor-
tunities for institutional learning as an independent effect emanating from 
international institutions on states‘ behavior. 
Interestingly, collective identity-building has been a more important func-
tion for ASEAN-EC relations even in the initial period of cooperation. I n-
terregionalism has helped both organizations developing actorness and 
gaining stature as international players. For ASEAN close relations with 
the most advanced regional organization h ad a prestige-enhancing effect 
within and outside the own region. Recognition is certainly a factor 
strengthening the legitimacy and, as a corollary, the internal cohesion of an 
organization. As for the EC, interregional relations boosted the fledgling 
European Political Cooperation (EPC). It thus no accident that when the 
EPC for the first time received a legal basis in the Single European Act, the 
Act  also  explicitly mentioned cooperation with other regional groupings as 
a major purpose (Regelsberger 1989:79). ASEAN, by contrast, had named 
the development of interregional relations a  raison d‘être of the organiza-
tion already in the grouping’s founding declaration. The 7
th point of the ASEAN and the European Union 
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Bangkok Declaration charges ASEAN with the task of „maintaining close 
and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organi-
zations with similar aims and purposes“ (Lukas 1989:103).  
Yet, the EC intentionally performed the role of an external federator in 
other ways, too. One such approach  was the conception of development 
projects on a regional scale which forced the recipients to intensify regional 
coordination and cooperation. Another approach was the introduction of 
cumulative rules of origin in 1975, which allowed ASEAN members to co-
operate in the production of finished products for export to the EC (Lukas 
1989:107; Dreis-Lampen 1998:112; Bridges 1999:77; Y eung/Perdikis/May 
1999:93). 
4.  ASEAN and the EU after 1990: From Bilateral  
Interregionalism to Transregionalism 
The collapse of socialism opened a n ew chapter of ASEAN-EC relations. 
From a realist perspective the transformation of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union can be read as a victory of the West over its Eastern adversar-
ies. No wonder that in the triumphalist mood following the end of the Cold 
War, Western powers staged an effort to impose their values on the non-
Western world. With the end of bipolarity, and seemingly relieved of the 
need for support in the bloc confrontation, even friendly authoritarian r e-
gimes in the Third World were increasingly viewed as an embarrassment 
by the West. This thinking is perhaps best reflected in President George 
Bush‘s proclamation of a New World Order attaching universalist meaning 
to liberal democracy, human rights, market economy and disarmament. By 
the early 1990s many Western countries including the EU had embarked on 
a policy of conditionality, linking development aid to compliance with 
these values. The Western value offensive may well be understood as an 
attempt to build „soft power“ (Nye 1990) which in the face of diffusing and 
less effective military power increasingly determines a nation state’s ability 
to influence international affairs. 
In Asia – and other parts of the Third World – this was regarded as a thinly 
veiled strategy to establish a unipolar world order and to impose a new Pax Jürgen Rüland 
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Americana on the rest of the world. Asian governments thus i ncreasingly 
opposed Western value-based policies and began to denounce them as neo-
colonialism and cultural hegemonism. As a consequence, controversies be-
tween ASEAN and EC, which before 1990 were mainly confined to eco-
nomic issues, entered the political sphere (Harris/Bridges 1983:47). Until 
1990 democracy and human rights had played a marginal role at best in of-
ficial ASEAN-EC relations. Occasional criticism o f human rights viola-
tions in Indonesia or a lack of democracy elsewhere in the region, was 
mainly aired by NGOs, the European Parliament (Snitwongse 1989:256) or 
– if coming from official quarters  -- was raised quietly. The perhaps only 
exception of European comments on the internal affairs of an ASEAN 
members was the Philippine People Power’s Revolution in 1986. The fall 
from power of strongman Ferdinand E. Marcos was enthusiastically 
greeted in the West and European governments rushed to commit them-
selves in support of the new administration under President Corazon 
Aquino (Regelsberger 1989:86).  
Clashes over values marked the 9th and 10th  ministerial meetings held in 
Manila and Luxembourg in 1991 and 1992. They were sparked by demands 
of the EC to include human rights and democracy clauses in an updated 
„third generation“ cooperation agreement which was to replace the Kuala 
Lumpur document of 1980 (Schumacher/Hampe 1999). Tensions rose fur-
ther after the killing of unarmed demonstrators by Indonesian security 
forces in Dili, East Timor, in November 1991. ASEAN’s accommodating 
policy of „constructive engagement“ vis-a-vis the discredited military junta 
in Burma did little to dispel them. The Burmese State Law and Order Res-
toration Committee (SLORC) had a reputation in the West as one of the 
worst human rights violators in Asia. When finally around 1993, ASEAN 
began to counter Western universalism with Asian cultural relativism 
through propagating the now infamous Asian value h ypothesis, ASEAN-
EC relations were caught in a stalemate.
5 
 
5   The literature on Asian values is now abundant. See, inter alia, Ishihara (1992); 
Mahbubani (1993, 1995); Kausikan (1993), Zakaria (1994); Jones (1994); Mahathir 
(1995); Mahathir and Ishihara (1995); Heinz (1995); Mols and Derichs (1995); 
Rüland (1996); Senghaas (1998).  ASEAN and the European Union 
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However, viewed from the realist perspective, interregional relations were 
more than merely an arena for clashing concepts of soft power. In view of 
widespread Asian fears over the completion of the European Single Market 
and an a nticipated „Fortress Europe“, interregionalism also mirrored shifts 
in the economic balance of power within the Triad. Special trade arrange-
ments in the form of European Treaties, paving the way to the eastern 
enlargement of the EC/EU, were suspected as diverting trade and invest-
ment from ASEAN. Similar effects would emanate from a „graduation 
mechanism“ built in by the EU into its GSP scheme which would incre-
mentally reduce benefits as countries climb up the economic hierarchy. 
ASEAN as one of the world’s  few developmental success stories would 
definitely fall under the new regulation (Chee 1997:20). Moreover, the u n-
certainties surrounding the Uruguay Round of GATT – not least caused by 
European intransigence over agricultural policies  – led the Asian side  into 
playing a new balancing game. Although initially only hesitantly respond-
ing to the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic C ooperation (APEC) 
(Weatherbee 1989)  – a transregional forum founded in late 1989 on Japa-
nese and Australian initiative  -- Asians began to appreciate APEC’s value 
as a balancing device against Europeans. The ratification of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) through US Congress in N o-
vember 1993 and APEC‘s show of force at the Seattle Summit a few days 
later finally extracted European GATT concessions and facilitated the 
completion of the Uruguay Round a few months later (Rüland 1996a, 
1999a; Roloff 1998; 2001; Hänggi 1999).  
For Europeans a protracted economic recession at home was perhaps of 
even greater concern. The resultant fears of becoming economically  – and 
in the long run politically  -- marginalized in an emerging Pacific Century 
were instrumental in effecting another major change in the EU‘s ASEAN 
policy. The 11th ministerial meeting held in Karlsruhe, Germany, i n Sep-
tember 1994, thus saw a return to more pragmatic policies and the down-
toning of value-related issues. Accordingly, the meeting‘s format and style 
basically followed ASEAN‘s terms, concentrating on areas of common 
(economic) interest, while bracketing  controversial (political) themes. The  
new „Spirit of Karlsruhe“ paved the way for launching the Asia-Europe Jürgen Rüland 
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Meeting (ASEM), a nascent transregional forum first proposed by Singa-
porean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in October 1994.
6  
After the first Summit  in March 1996, ASEM increasingly absorbed the 
ASEAN-EC biregional dialogue which after 1997 went into a process of 
atrophy. Although another ministerial meeting took place in Singapore in 
February 1997, the relationship was soon overshadowed by an intensifying 
controversy over Burma following the latter’s acceptance as a new member 
by ASEAN in July 1997. The EU, which had earlier imposed sanctions on 
the Burmese junta, rejected ASEAN and Burmese demands for participa-
tion in the dialogue by arguing that the  Burmese military rulers have failed 
to open a dialogue with the opposition and to release political prisoners.  
The ensuing impasse in the ASEAN-EC dialogue is to a great extent the 
result of another change in the Triadic power equation. While the Asian 
financial crisis has seriously undermined ASEAN’s internal cohesion and 
external clout, it emboldened the EU to return to its previous value-based 
foreign policy. As both sides were unable, and unwilling, to compromise 
on Burma, JCC meetings were postponed f or more than two years and the 
ministerial meetings for nearly three years. The deadlock was only broken 
after protracted negotiations in May 2000 when, finally, the EU allowed 
Burma to attend JCC meetings along with the other new members of the 
ASEAN – Laos and Cambodia – provided that none of their representatives 
speaks at the meeting. However, while Laos and Cambodia were admitted 
to the ASEAN-EU Cooperation Agreement in July 2000, the EU still o p-
posed the accession of Burma. Nevertheless, Burma was allowed to attend 
the 13th ministerial meeting held in December 2000 in Vientiane, Laos. 
The EU, however, insisted that the human rights situation in Burma was 
not only part of the meeting’s agenda, but would also be i ncluded in the 
joint declaration.
7 Thus, beyond the fact that it took place at all, the Vienti-
ane ministerial meeting did little to get the ASEAN-EC dialogue back on 
 
6   For details, see Rüland (1996). 
7   See Vientiane Declaration. The Thirteenth Ministerial Meeting, Vientiane, 11-12 
December 2000, Pojnt 9 and 10. ASEAN and the European Union 
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track. It was marred by heated exchanges over human rights issues and a 
low level of European attendance.
8 
After 1990, the ASEAN-EC relationship’s main contribution to institution-
building was the launching of ASEM which will be discussed in greater 
detail below. Under the bi-regional dialogue European Business Informa-
tion Centres (EBICs) were set up in Manila (1993), Kuala Lumpur, Bang-
kok, Singapore and Jakarta (1995) and an Eminent Persons‘ Group (EPG) 
entrusted with inhaling new visions into the ASEAN-EU relationship 
(Rüland 1996a:52; Chee 1997:13; Dreis-Lampen 1998:126; Robles 
2001:27).
9 A Commission policy paper, entitled „Towards a New Asia 
Strategy“  -- approved by the EU Summit in Essen (1994) and the European 
Parliament in 1995  -- made ASEAN a cornerstone of Europe’s relations 
with Asia, but went far beyond discussing ASEAN-EC relations (Rüland 
1996a). In May 2000, the JCC finalized a new strategy paper  – the „EU-
ASEAN Work Programme“  – providing guidelines for future ASEAN-EC 
cooperation. However, its relevance has already been subjected to doubts 
by recent news from Brussels that the Commission is in the process of re-
vising its 1994 Asia strategy paper, and henceforth may be giving greater 
priority to East Asia and India than to ASEAN.
10  
Finally, despite the turbulences in the relationship, the EC continued to act 
as an external federator for ASEAN even after 1990. ASEAN access  to 
European Investment Bank (EIB) financing  -- long demanded by ASEAN – 
was finally granted by the EC at the 10th ministerial meeting in Manila, but 
linked to projects fostering regional integration, closer relations between 
Europe and Asia, or resulting i n environmental improvements (Robles 
2001:22). The unintentional part of ASEAN identity-building through i n-
terregionalism was facilitated through the value controversies. Even if its 
mythological character can hardly be overlooked (Rüland 1996b), the 
Asian value hypothesis has at least temporarily strengthened ASEAN as a 
 
8   For details, see reporting in The Straits Times and The Nation Review between 8 
and 13 December 2000. 
9   The Eminent Persons‘ Group, formed in January 1994; submitted a report „A New 
Strategy for a New Partnership“ in June 1996. 
10  See Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 July 2001, p. 12. Jürgen Rüland 
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regional entity. However, under the impact of the Asian financial crisis not 
only the Asian value hypothesis crumbled, but ASEAN solidarity, too 
(Acharya 1999; Rüland 2000a, 2001).  
5.  The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): The Rise of 
Transregionalism 
Many of the functions of the ASEAN-EC dialogue have been taken over by 
two new transregional fora: The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Pelkmans 1997:49). As the European i n-
volvement in the ARF is rather limited and partly overlapping with ASEM, 
we concentrate in the following paragraphs on ASEM.
11 
As mentioned earlier, an Asia-Europe Summit, nonexistent under the 
ASEAN-EC bi-regional format, was first proposed by Singaporean Prime 
Minister Gioh Chok Tong in Paris in October 1994. While membership in 
the ASEM was initially contested, an agreement was finally reached that 
ASEM would include the fifteen members of the EU plus the European 
Commission, the then seven members of ASEAN plus China, Japan and 
South Korea. The first of so far three summits took place in Bangkok in 
March 1996.   
Not surprisingly, realists tend to view the emergence of ASEM mainly in 
balancing terms. The perceptions of a forthcoming Pacific Century, reflect-
ing gravitational shifts in the global economy and the Triadic power equa-
tion (Roloff 1998, 2001; Hänggi 1999), that have already spurred major 
changes in Europe’s Asia Policy at the Karlruhe ministerial meeting in 
1994, have also been key motivations for the European participation in 
ASEM. For Europeans, the inclusion of East Asian economic heavy 
weights China, Japan and South Korea in the forum held much attraction, 
while ASEAN hoped to benefit from the inclusion of East Asia by increas-
ing its bargaining power. ASEM was thus a welcome device to balance the 
 
11  The subequent section follows closely a paper presented by the author at the Third 
ASEF Summer School in Lund, Sweden on 17 August 2001. ASEAN and the European Union 
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changing geoeconomic fortunes and to give Europe a new foothold in the 
world’s economically most dynamic region. 
Although the Asian economic miracle seemingly endowed Asians with a 
greater leverage, for them, too, ASEM provided a valuable balancing d e-
vice. Many in Pacific Asia regarded US activism in APEC as a thinly 
veiled strategy for pressing open Asian markets in an attempt to reduce 
Washington’s huge trade deficit with the economies of the Western Pacific. 
ASEM was thus seen as a chance curtailing American influence in the r e-
gion. Yet, it was also a device balancing European and American moves to 
revitalize their transatlantic partnership. For Europeans the  New Transat-
lantic Agenda of 1995 served as a move to halt the perceived shift of 
American interests from the Atlantic to the Pacific, for Americans it was a 
move to counter the evolving Asian-European alliance under ASEM. But 
worries over a new American isolation following the Republican triumph 
in the 1994 Congressional elections and old concerns over European pro-
tectionism likewise motivated ASEAN to take the lead in the creation of 
ASEM. After all, despite a relative decline, Europe was still a major market 
for ASEAN exports. European antidumping measures, moves of the Euro-
pean Commission to phase out tariff concessions ASEAN countries e n-
joyed since 1971 and the progress made on the way towards a European 
Monetary Union (EMU) alarmed the Asian side and kept alive the ghost of 
a  „Fortress Europe“.
12 Moreover, ASEAN saw in ASEM a useful tool to 
counter European activities to establish free trade agreements with other 
regional organizations such as the MERCOSUR and SADC or large emerg-
ing markets such as South Africa and Mexico. Finally, and this was per-
haps the most important common denominator, ASEM seemed to promise 
increased bargaining options for both sides in global fora.  
Beyond its functions of a balancer, ASEM has made a modest contribution 
to international institution-building at three levels. Firstly by establishing a 
„missing link“ in Triad relations, secondly by a creeping institutionaliza-
 
12  Fears of a Fortress Europe were widely aired in Asia since the passing of the Euro-
pean Single Act in 1986. Jürgen Rüland 
  24
tion of ASEM itself and thirdly by institutionalizing East Asian coopera-
tion.  
Not much needs to be said about the „missing link“ argument. Comple-
menting transatlantic and transpacific relations, ASEM completed the 
evolving structures of transregionalism. Yet ASEM is still a weak forum. 
Reflecting the power equation at the time of the forum‘s formation, the 
Asian side succeeded in defining cooperation principles patterned after the 
ASEAN Way. ASEM was thus designed as a nonbinding, informal, consen-
sus-oriented consultative forum without institutions and a pre-agreed 
agenda. The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) endorsed by 
ASEM-2 in London (1998)
13 a nd more elaborated by ASEM-3 in Seoul 
(2000) confirmed these principles (Hund 1998).  
Yet, their aversion vis-à-vis formal institutions notwithstanding, the archi-
tects of ASEM could not prevent a process of creeping institutionalization 
(Bersick 1999a; Lim 2000a). As ASEM got a promising start at the inaugu-
ral Bangkok Summit in March 1996, interactions inevitably intensified 
over the next few years. Bi-annual summits, various ministerial rounds i n-
cluding the foreign, finance, economic ministers, environmental and educa-
tion ministers, Senior Officials‘ Meetings (SOM), the creation of an Asia-
Europe Business Forum and the establishment of the Asia-Europe Founda-
tion (ASEF) contributed to this process of shallow institutionalization. The 
intellectual exchanges a nd peoples-to-peoples links promoted by ASEF, the 
inauguration of track two processes by the Council of Asia-Europe Coop-
eration (CAEC) and think tanks of both regions, the rise of epistemic com-
munities including the appointment of an Asia-Europe V ision Group and 
the formation of an Asia-Europe People’s Forum organizing NGO parallel 
summits with an alternative agenda have helped to create personal and i n-
stitutional networks hitherto unseen in Euro-Asian relations. Still lacking, 
however, is an ASEM secretariat. 
Perhaps the most pivotal contribution ASEM has made to institution-
building is its impact on East Asian cooperation. In fact, ASEM has  de 
 
13  See Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework, Senior Officials‘ Meeting, London, 20 
February 1998, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_process/aecf.htm. ASEAN and the European Union 
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facto brought into being M alaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s 
long cherished, yet controversial proposal of an East Asian Economic 
Grouping/Caucus (EAEG/EAEC). It did not go u nnoticed that the ten 
Asian members of ASEM fully coincide with the EAEC membership envi-
sioned by Mahathir. Perhaps even more important for East Asian coopera-
tion than this sheer coincidence became the increasingly urgent need to 
match the superior coordinative machinery of the EU. The need to work out 
common positions paved the way for Asian caucuses prior to ASEM meet-
ings and the nomination of two Asian coordinators (Soesastro/Nuttall 1997; 
Synnott 1999; Hänggi 2000).  
East Asian cooperation got an additional push in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis (Rüland 1999b; Higgott 2000). As ASEAN learnt the pain-
ful lesson that the organization is too weak to manage a major economic 
crisis on its own, ASEAN sought to strengthen its bargaining power by 
closer cooperation with Northeast Asia. In December 1997, at the sidelines 
of its First Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN organized the first 
East Asian Summit. Since then, these summits have become a regular oc-
currence and are now an integral part of ASEAN’s annual informal sum-
mits. ASEAN+3 Cooperation was further boosted by the Joint Statement on 
East Asia Cooperation concluded at ASEAN’s i nformal Manila Summit in 
November 1999. Already in the year before, East Asian ministerial rounds 
involving finance and environmental ministers had been launched. Japan 
had proposed Senior Officials‘ Meetings, South Korea the formation of an 
East Asian Vision Group. Another noteworthy step towards closer East 
Asian cooperation was the Chiang Mai Initiative which by some observers 
is prematurely viewed as the nucleus of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
(Dieter 2000; Higgott 2001). Yet, even giving due recognition to these e f-
forts of broadening Asian cooperation, nothing would be more wrong than 
to portray them as an incipient process of deep institutionalization. So far 
they are little more than moves to balance resurgent Western economic 
prowess and to pool bargaining power in global fora. Taking into account 
the diversity of interests among major Asian players such as China, Japan 
and Indonesia, it is difficult to see how East Asian cooperation will go be-
yond that point in the near future. Jürgen Rüland 
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As explained earlier, transregional fora may also serve as rationalizers and 
agenda-setters of global institutions. Unfortunately, so far, ASEM has 
achieved little in these terms. Talks at the senior officials‘ level to define 
common Euro-Asian positions prior to the WTO ministerial meeting held 
in Singapore in late 1996 failed to produce tangible results (Gode-
ment/Jacquet 1997:71). Still very much in line with the economic power 
equation prior to the Asian financial crisis, Asian views prevailed in trans-
ferring the labor standards issue to the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), only to resurface on the WTO agenda three years later after the eco-
nomic fortunes have taken a dramatic turn around. ASEM – like APEC two 
years earlier  – also failed to agree on principles of an investment code pat-
terned after the abortive  Multilateral Agreement on  Investment (MAI) as 
proposed by the OECD (Chee 1997:23). In the case of the WTO chairman-
ship Europeans backtracked in their support of Asian candidate Supachai 
Panichpakdi. Perhaps ASEM’s greatest flaw was its failure  – again in con-
sonance with APEC – to agree on the modalities of a new WTO millenium 
trade liberalization round. While Europeans lobbyied for a comprehensive 
round and the US preferred sectoral liberalization, several developing 
Asian countries pressed for the prior implementation of the Uruguay Round 
agreements (Baumann 1999).     
Compared to APEC, which is essentially confined to trade issues, ASEM 
pursues a broader format. On the insistence of Europeans, ASEM also de-
veloped a political dialogue which on paper is well suited for performing 
agenda-setting and rationalizing functions. Unfortunately, however, what 
Asian and European diplomats ritually praise as a frank and open political 
dialogue has rarely been more than a typical euphemism of Asian-style di-
plomacy. With a few exceptions, sensitive issues such as East Timor, 
Burma, democracy and human rights have been bracketed. If it achieved 
anything, the political dialogue at best enhanced transparency of policy po-
sitions, thus creating greater predictability for negotiations in global fora. 
Yet, as Asian and European positions lay far apart in many issues, this 
amounted to little more than the predictabilty of disagreement. 
ASEM has however avoided to further dilute its shallow institutions by 
widening. D espite some twenty-five applications for membership in 1998, ASEAN and the European Union 
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ASEM-2 and ASEM-3 did  not accept new members. The membership 
moratorium, however, had a fortunate side effect for ASEAN-EU relations. 
It enabled the two organizations to sidestep the Burma issue and keep inter-
regional communication intact. 
Identity-building primarily occurred on the Asian side (Camroux/Lechervy 
1996; Gilson 1998; Hänggi 2000). Here, ASEM has indeed helped to con-
struct the notion of an East Asian region with a set of common cultural val-
ues and a core of shared interests. This identity-building and the intensifi-
cation of East Asian cooperation as described above are mutually reinforc-
ing processes. 
6. Whither ASEAN-EU Relations 
Our study of ASEAN-EU interregionalism presents five major conclusions. 
First, while revealing potential for being a building block in an emerging 
system of global governance, ASEAN-EU interregionalism is still riddled 
with serious problems. One such problem is that  – like other interregional 
relationships too  -- ASEAN-EU interregionalism basically performs bal-
ancing functions. This reduces incentives for deepening inter- and transre-
gional institutions. Although the EU has an interest in developing a more 
contractual and legalistic form of interregionalism, it is u ndermining efforts 
of institutionalizing the relationship by a highly opportunistic policy 
(Rüland 1996a). The EU’s policy vis-à-vis ASEAN lacks direction and 
strongly responds to changing power relations. Its pre- and post-Asian cri-
sis value policy is indicative of this. 
Second, if ASEAN-EU relations, and interregionalism in general, are to 
develop into building blocks for global governance, more institutionaliza-
tion of these relations is definitely needed. If, on the other hand, the present 
low level of institutionalization persists, there is little likelihood that the 
relationship will ever transcend the present state of low politics character-
ized by a laundry list of uncoordinated projects. European post-Asian crisis 
policies have clearly shown that such kind of token multilateralism gener-
ates little public interest in Europe and thus makes it difficult for less m y-Jürgen Rüland 
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opic political forces to justify higher than present institutional costs of i n-
terregional relationships. 
Third, by creating parallel structures including ASEAN-EU ministerial 
meetings and ASEM, Euro-Asian interregionalism has contributed to r e-
dundancy in international institution-building. ASEM reflects ASEAN’s 
lack of political clout in global fora and is increasingly taking over func-
tions of the previous bi-regional relationship. The latter is not entirely fad-
ing away, but increasingly falling into a status of irrelevance as the most 
recent ministerial meeting in Vientiane suggests. Yet, ASEM has kept the 
relationship alive as it offered a way out of the „Burma  conundrum“ 
(Bridges 1999:88). 
Fourth, the poor performance of ASEM (and APEC) in managing the Asian 
crisis has undoubtedly eroded the legitimacy of inter- and transregional 
fora. Even more undermining their legitimacy is the utter lack of democ-
ratic transparence of these dialogues. Increasingly they appear as arcane 
expert talks with very little feed back by and from the grass-roots, repre-
sented either by national parliaments or civil society. Except for the busi-
ness fora, interregional parliamentary and civil society discourses are only 
very weakly, if at all, institutionally connected to the official track one 
(Lim 2000b). Although ASEF is well performing the important task of nur-
turing peoples-to-peoples contacts (Bersick 1999b), it is a fact that by plac-
ing them under the tutelage of ASEF, civil society has been isolated from 
track one. 
Fifth, while the response of  ASEM to the Asian crisis was less than satis-
factory and thus has contributed to doubts over the forum, ASEM-3, though 
not being a breakthrough to a revitalized partnership, has nevertheless cre-
ated new perspectives. The Asian side, however, was adamantly upholding 
its aversion against further institutionalization of the relationship. Yet, as 
remarks by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung quoted in the press sug-
gest, there are cracks in the Asian phalanx.
14 Moreover, it is also a step in 
the right direction if summiteers agreed that the political dialogue should 
take a more focused form in the future (Rüland 2000b; Köllner 2000). Con-
 
14  See Korea Herald, 21 October 2000 (Internet). ASEAN and the European Union 
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centrating the political dialogue on one or two key issues could be a point 
of departure for developing more binding positions which, introduced into 
global fora, could make a greater impact on decision-making there. Note-
worthy is also the initiation of a parliamentary  dialogue at the sidelines of 
ASEM which needs to be nurtured further. Yet, reflecting the increasing 
economic stratification of Asia, European interests, will however shift to 
China and the rest of East Asia and, to a lesser extant, to India. For ASEAN 
this means that it will have to struggle to maintain its central position in 
Euro-Asian relations. Jürgen Rüland 
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